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PROPERTIES*
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Worldwide, many cultural properties have been wrongfully exported to other countries in times
of war and colonization. Furthermore, cultural properties are currently constant targets of illegal
transaction due to their substantial economic value. Illicit trade in cultural properties is now the
third largest black market after drug and firearms. There are several international treaties
aimed at combating the illicit export and enabling the restitution of cultural properties. Despite
these efforts, more legislative and judicial cooperation between countries will be necessary to truly
solve the problem. This article reviews international legal instruments for restitution of illegally
exported cultural property, and suggests some new judicial principles that should be applied by
domestic courts for supplementing drawbacks of international treaties. The author suggests to
adopt “lex originis” rule for choice of governing law instead of traditional “lex rei sitae” rule
and to apply to shifting burden of proof to a certain extent to find a solution for disputes over
cultural properties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, two significant incidents occurred regarding the
restitution of cultural properties: Korea recovered 297 volumes of the
royal Uigwe1 that had been carried away by French soldiers from the
Oegyujanggak2 during the French Invasion of 1866 and stored in the
Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF)3; and Turkey recovered the
Bogazköy Sphinx, which was the object of a long-running dispute
between Turkey and Germany, from the Pergamon Museum in
Berlin, Germany.4 Those cases captured the world’s attention.
The cultural properties in those cases were illegally exported
during the Imperial Period. The matter of restitution of cultural
properties is mostly recognized as pertaining to cultural properties
illegally exported during World War I, World War II, or the period
when imperialism was rampant, as these types of cultural properties
are at the center of a significant portion of restitution disputes.
According to the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea, as of
2015 a total of 160,342 pieces Korean cultural properties reside
overseas. Among those cultural properties, approximately 75,000
pieces are thought to have been illegally exported to an estimated 20
countries.
Most of those cultural properties were illegally exported
during the Japanese colonial period, the U.S. military government
period, and the historical turmoil of the Korean War. Most cultural
1
The Uigwe are Royal Records of the State Rites of the Joseon
Dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula from 1392 until 1897. Douglas Cox,
Case Note, “Inalienable” Archives: Korean Royal Archives as French Property under
International Law, 18 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROPERTY 410 (2011).
2
The Oegyujanggak was the Royal Library of the Joseon Dynasty,
located outside of the royal palace. Id. at 411.
3
See S. Korea welcomes accord with France on transfer of ‘Oegyujanggak’ royal
books,
KOREA
HERALD,
Mar.
17,
2011,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/17/34/0301000000AEN2011
0317001800315F.HTML; see Cox, supra note 1, at 409-23 (for a case study of the
Uigwe).
4
Çorum - Anatolia News Agency, Hattu a reunites with sphinx,
HURRIYET
DAILY
NEWS,
Nov.
7,
2011,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hattusa-reunites-withsphinx.aspx?pageID=238&nID=7062&NewsCatID=385.

719

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

properties plundered and illegally exported during the age of
imperialism have not been returned so far. Even so, the restitution of
cultural properties is becoming a bigger global issue. However, not all
cultural properties were exported during past, unfortunate periods.
Cultural properties are currently constant targets of illegal transaction
stemming from their inherently enormous value. According to the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ), illegal cultural properties
make up the third largest concentrated black market— after the
illegal drug and firearms markets.5 In particular, illegal transactions of
cultural properties in the Middle East are reported to be a basis for
funding terrorist groups.6,7
With the development of means of communicating and
conducting transactions, the current illegal trade of cultural properties
has grown to include not only criminal organizations, but also
ordinary people. For example, the illegal transaction of cultural
properties is frequently carried out using online auction sites such as
eBay8 and international parcel delivery services.9 This situation is

5
Noah Charney et al., Protecting Cultural Heritage from Art Theft:
International Challenge, Local Opportunity, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. (U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, D.C.), Mar. 2012, https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/march/protecting-culturalheritage-from-art-theft-international-challenge-local-opportunity.
6
See Kimberly L. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves: Organized Crime and
the Illicit Antiquities Trade, 45 IND. L. REV. 601, 609-611 (2012); Russell Howard et
al., Digging in and Trafficking out: How the Destruction of Cultural Heritage Funds Terrorism,
8 CTC SENTINEL 14, 14-17 (2015); Janine di Giovanni et al., How does ISIS fund its
reign
of
terror?
NEWSWEEK,
Nov.
6,
2014,
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-terror282607.html.
7
On Feb. 12, 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2199
at its 7379 meeting. Resolution 2199 condemns the destruction of cultural heritage
in Iraq and Syria, particularly by ISIL and ANF, and also decrees that all Member
States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural
properties and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and
religious importance that have been illegally removed from Iraq since Aug. 6, 1990
and from Syria since Mar. 5, 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in
such items. United Nations, Press Release, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2199
(2015), Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida Associated Groups,
Threatens
Further
Targeted
Sanctions,
Feb.
12,
2015,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11775.doc.htm.
8
Kurt Siehr, Unidroit Convention of 1995 and Unclaimed Cultural Property
without Provenance, 2013 ELTE L. J. 89, 95 (2013).
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additionally problematic given the people involved in such
transactions are often unaware that the transactions run afoul of the
law.
International societies agree on the necessity of preventing
illegal transactions of cultural properties and returning them to their
source countries. In response to this increasing problem, they have
established various international norms, such as the 1970 UNESCO
Convention10 and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.11 However,
some disputes over the restitution of cultural properties cannot be
resolved through such conventions. Those disputes can be resolved
through diplomatic channels, mutual agreements, or decisions of
domestic courts.
Although each country usually has a national law to prevent
illegal exportation of cultural properties, few nations have any special
act applicable to disputes over the restitution of cultural properties.
Therefore when a lawsuit for the restitution of illegally exported
cultural properties is filed in a domestic court, the competent court
has no option but to apply general legal principles applicable to a
lawsuit over other goods. However, if the court applies general legal
principles, it might overlook the unique characteristics of cultural
properties. Cultural properties differ from typical goods given that
the property contains special relevance to the historical, spiritual, and
cultural identity of a state unlike other goods. This intrinsic and
specialized value exemplifies why cultural properties should not be
distributed by normal market forces.

9
Crime ring busted for smuggling Korean relics overseas, DONG-A IIBO, Apr.
27, 2012, http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/403691/1.
10
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970, Nov. 14,
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 321, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter 1970
UNESCO Convention]. The Convention has been in force since Apr. 27, 1972,
with
131
State
Parties
as
of
April
2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016).
11 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT Convention].
The Convention has been in force since July 1, 1998, with 37 State Parties as of
April 2016. http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last accessed May 4, 2016).
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Based on such a viewpoint, this paper suggests some legal
principles that could be applied to international disputes over
restitution of cultural property, particularly in the global context.
Chapter II examines the meaning and characteristics of cultural
property. Chapter III reviews international legal instruments for
prevention of illegal exportation of cultural property and restitution.
Chapter IV identifies some problems posed in cases where a lawsuit
over restitution of cultural property is filed in a domestic court, and
suggests new judicial principles to solve the problems. Chapter V
summarizes the conclusions.
II. THE MEANING OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. The Definition of Cultural Property
At the outset, it is imperative to clarify what should be
identified as cultural property. The classification of the property itself is
a preliminary question to all legal challenges in the restitution of
cultural property issues. It is difficult to establish a universal
definition of cultural property. Broadly stated, the term cultural property
refers to objects with artistic, ethnographic, archaeological, or
historical value.12 Cultural property includes art, artifacts, antiques,
historical monuments, rare collections, religious objects of
importance to the cultural identity of a group of people, and other
items representing significant historical, artistic, and social
accomplishments.13
The word property has a semantic nuance limited to tangible
things. However, a product of the cultural activities of a human being
or tribe contains a myriad of intangible things. Therefore, the term
cultural heritage is sometimes used as a broad concept encompassing
not only tangible, but also intangible cultural products.14 Also, the use
of word property in relation to cultural property slants considerably
12
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES:
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 27 (2nd ed. 2009).
13
Christine K. Knox, Note: They’ve lost their Marbles: 2002 Universal
Museums’ Declaration, the Elgin Marbles and the Future of the Repatriation Movement, 29
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 315, 317-318 (2006).
14
Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural
Property’?, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 307-08 (1992).
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toward economic value and connotes protection of the rights of the
possessor.15 Thus, the term cultural object is sometimes used instead of
cultural property to exclude the implication of ownership. Because
uniform standards have not been established for the definition of
cultural property, and each country defines the term according to its
national laws or classification by its experts.16 The terms are
commonly used interchangeably without strict differentiation. Since,
in the interest of brevity, all the legal definitions of cultural property
by each state cannot be reviewed, this section focuses on the
definitions in major conventions.
It is noted that the 1954 Hague Convention17 is the first time
the term cultural property was employed in an international legal
context.18 The 1954 Hague Convention compromised in defining
cultural property by using an illustrative definition in the form of lists
of cultural properties as objects of protection. Article 1 of the 1954
Hague Convention describes the objects entitled to consideration as
cultural properties regardless of their origin and ownership.19 By
Id. at 307, 309-10.
ART LAW HANDBOOK 391 (Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000).
17
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. The Convention
has been in force since August 7, 1956 with 127 States Parties as of April 2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016)
18
Manlio Frigo, Cultural property v. cultural heritage: A “battle of concepts” in
international law?, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 367, 367 (2004).
19
See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 17, at 242. [Definition of
cultural property].
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term ‘cultural
property’ shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular;
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of
historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest;
as well as scientific collections and important collections of
books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined
above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or
exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph
15
16
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contrast, Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides a
specific definition of cultural property.20 As regards the notion of
cultural property, Cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives,
and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict,
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a);
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as
defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘centers
containing monuments’.
20 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 234-35.
For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ means property
which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science
and which belongs to the following categories:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science
and technology and military and social history, to the life of
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of
national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or
archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely
by hand on any support and in any material (excluding
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated
by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any
material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any
material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific,
literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old
musical instruments.
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have been a source of contention,21 and international conventions
properly consider both views. The 1954 Hague Convention defines
cultural property as objects of protection from the standpoint of
cultural internationalism.22 Although the 1970 UNESCO Convention
embraces both cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism, it is
generally perceived to have favored cultural nationalism.23 This
understanding is supported by the preamble of this Convention:
Cultural property constitutes one of the basic
elements of civilization and national culture, that its
true value can be appreciated only in relation to the
fullest possible information regarding origin, history
and traditional setting, and that it is incumbent upon
every State to protect the cultural property existing
within its territory against the dangers of theft,
clandestine excavation, and illicit export.24
This expression puts stresses on the national characteristics of
cultural property.
Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention enumerates 11
abstract categories in its definition of cultural property and
commissions a concrete definition of cultural property to a special
designation within each state. That is, among the items enumerated
from (a) to (k), only those “specifically designated” by each state are
acknowledged as cultural properties.25 In other words, the 1970
UNESCO Convention vests each country with broad discretion to
determine what should be protected as cultural properties.
Accordingly the State Parties deem which specifically designated
items will be protected as cultural properties under their national laws
pursuant to this Convention. In addition to the categories provided
in Article 1, Article 4 establishes five categories of cultural
properties.26 Article 4 protects items that are worth protecting, but
21
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80
AM. J. INT’L L., 831, 831-833 (1986).
22
Id. at 833.
23
Id. at 842.
24
See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 232.
25
See supra text accompanying note 20.
26
See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 237-38:
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not specifically designated as cultural property under national law per
Article 1.
The most controversial issue in the drafting of the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention was how to define cultural objects.27 Some
advocated a comprehensive definition, while others sought a concrete
and enumerative definition. Ultimately, the Convention used an
eclectic approach.28 Particularly, the Convention adopted a
comprehensive clause for the definition of cultural property in Article
229 and enumerated concrete objects to be regarded as cultural
property in the Annex.30

The States Parties to this Convention recognize that for the
purpose of the Convention property which belongs to the
following categories forms part of the cultural heritage of each
State:
(a) Cultural property created by the individual or collective
genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural property
of importance to the State concerned created within the territory
of that State by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident
within such territory;
(b) cultural property found within the national territory;
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological or
natural science missions, with the consent of the competent
authorities of the country of origin of such property;
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely
agreed exchange;
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally with
the consent of the competent authorities of the country of origin
of such property.
27 IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION:
A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 72 (2011).
28
Id.
29 See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at 464, which states:
For the purposes of this Convention, cultural objects are those which, on religious
or secular grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history,
literature, art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex to
this Convention.
30 Id. at 473. The Annex states:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science
and technology and military and social history, to the life of
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B. Cultural Property as res extra commercium
Things (goods) can be classified according to diverse
academic criteria. One type of classification is the characterization of
goods as res in commercio (a thing inside commerce) or res extra
commercium (a thing outside commerce).31 Res in commercio includes
objects that can be transacted under private laws; contrariwise res
extra commercium objects cannot be so. Most countries have cultural
property protection–related laws, which prohibit the transfer or
distribution of cultural property. The origin of such provisions needs
some explanation.
The classification of objects into res in commercio and res extra
commercium dates back to the Institutiones and Digesta of the Corpus iuris
civilis issued from 529 to 534 by order of Justinian I, Eastern Roman
Emperor.32 The Corpus iuris civilis classifies objects into those subject
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of
national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or
archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on
any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and
manufactured articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific,
literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old
musical instruments.
31
AMAILE WEIDNER, KULTURGÜTER ALS RES EXTRA COMMERCIUM IM
INTERNATIONALEN SACHENRECHT 15 (2001).
32
Id. at 15.
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to human law (res humani iuris) and those subject to divine law (res
divini iuris). Res divini iuris, things that build the relationship between
god and man, were regarded as res extra commercium and could never
be alienable in any case.33 Things among res humani iuris could also be
regarded as res extra commercium, such as res publicae, which belongs to
the state; res communes omnium, which refers to natural things such as
air, sea, and rivers; and res in patrimonio Caesaris, which refers to
Caesar’s Legacy.34 In the case of artworks, the Corpus iuris civilis
established some as res divini iuris and others as res publicae, both of
which were res extra commercium. The remaining artworks could be
transacted as res private, which were personal belongings.35 The
current classification of things and the concept of cultural property
under the cultural property protection–related laws of each country
thus fundamentally originated in the Corpus iuris civilis. Res sacra under
Canon Law succeeded res extra commercium for artworks under the
Corpus iuris civilis. Afterwards, first in Europe, Greece promulgated a
cultural property protection law in 1834, followed by France in 1887,
Italy in 1902, and Germany in 1955.
Currently, most states acknowledge inalienability for certain
types of cultural properties according to their own cultural property
protection–related laws. Nowadays, the idea of cultural properties as
res extra commercium means the property can be inalienable and
imprescriptible under private law. Furthermore, the property can be
state-owned under public law and thus be forbidden goods for export
and import under international trade law.36
In Korea, Article 21 of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act
forbids the export of cultural properties. Article 54 of the same Act
prohibits any transfer or establishment of private rights for stateowned cultural properties. The foundation of those provisions is in

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 18-19.
35
Id. at 19-21; MARC WEBER, UNVERÄUßERLICHES KULTURGUT IM
NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR 6 (Dr. Wilfried Fieldler,
Dr. Dr.h.c. Erik Jayme, Dr. Kurt Sieher, eds., 2002)
36
WEIDNER, supra note 31, at 35-43. See also Kurt Siehr, Legal Aspects of
the Mystification and Demystification of Cultural Property, 16 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAW
173, 202-203 (2011).
33
34
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the classification of res extra commercium for artworks under the Corpus
iuris civilis.

III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR RESTITUTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. Multilateral Conventions
1. The 1954 Hague Convention
World War I and World War II brought unprecedented
plunder and destruction of cultural property to the world, which
clarified a need to establish an international convention to protect
cultural heritage in time of war. In 1954 at The Hague, the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict37 and a separate optional protocol called the First
Protocol were adopted. The 1954 Hague Convention and the
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, which constitute
an integral part of it, are the basic and comprehensive international
treaty focusing on the protection of cultural property during wartime
or armed conflict.38 The 1954 Hague Convention is supplemented by
the First Protocol,39 adopted with the Convention, and the Second
Protocol,40 adopted in 1999. It is also influenced by incidents that
took place in Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 17.
John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the
Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVT’L L. & POL’Y J.
1, 38 (2004).
39
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, The Hague 14 May 1954 [hereinafter First
Protocol] First Protocol of has been in force since 7 August 1956 with 104 States
Parties
as
of
April
2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15391&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016).
40
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, March 26, 1999
37
38
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The major content of the 1954 Hague Convention about the
restitution of cultural property is contained in the First Protocol.
Each signatory state agrees to prevent the exportation of cultural
property from any territory it occupies during an armed conflict41; to
take into its custody cultural property imported into its territory
either directly or indirectly from any occupied territory42; and to
return, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the
territory previously occupied, cultural property in its territory.43
Cultural property taken from the territory of a signatory state and
deposited by it in the territory of another signatory state for the
purpose of protecting such property against the dangers of an armed
conflict shall be returned by the latter at the end of hostilities to the
competent authorities of the territory from which it came.44
2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
Given the 1954 Hague Convention was promulgated on the
premise of a special situation, the protection of cultural property in
the event of armed conflict, international society started debating the
need to establish a more comprehensive international instrument
applicable for a broader protection of cultural property.
Immediately after World War I, the League of Nations
debated the matter of plunder of cultural property.45 UNESCO
prepared a draft convention about the restitution of artistic,
historical, or scientific objects illegally transferred in cooperation with
the Office International des Musées (OIM).46 However, this attempt failed
to advance further because of the outbreak of World War II in 1939,
and afterward, UNESCO could not help concentrating on the 1954
[hereinafter Second Protocol]. The Second Protocol has been in force since 27
April
1972
with
68
State
Parties
as
of
April
2016.
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E
(last
accessed May 4, 2016).
41
First Protocol, supra note 39, at Part I.
42
Id. at Part I.2.
43
Id. at Part I.3.
44
Id. at Part II.5.
45
PATRICK J. O’KEEFE & LYNDEL V. PROTT, CULTURAL HERITAGE
CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 64 (2011).
46
PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE 1970 UNESCO
CONVENTION 3 (2nd ed. 2007).
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Hague Convention.47 As newly independent and East European
countries with particular interest in the restitution of cultural property
increasingly participated in that Convention, UNESCO came to face
new challenges. In particular, Mexico and Peru posed problems of
unlawful trade in cultural property during the 11th General
Conference of UNESCO in 1960, and it became clear that the First
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention alone could not deal with
these problems comprehensively.48 Accordingly, UNESCO adopted
the Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property in 1964 as a
preliminary step.49 A convention draft based on that
Recommendation was circulated to collect the opinions of member
states in 1968, and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property was adopted on November 14, 1970 by the General
Conference of UNESCO at its 16th session. This is called the 1970
UNESCO Convention, and it established an international normative
framework to prevent the illicit traffic of cultural property during
peacetime.50
This Convention, which contains a preamble and 26 articles,
protects cultural property from illicit trade by means of
administrative enforcement and international cooperation, rather
than by private law. The major contents of this Convention are as
follows: (a) the Convention acknowledges that the import, export, or
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the
provisions adopted under this Convention is illicit51; (b) member
states undertake to set up national services and establish a list of
important public and private cultural properties to be protected52; (c)
they undertake to introduce an appropriate certificate for the export
of cultural property53; (d) they agree to take the necessary measures
O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 45 at 64.
O’KEEFE, supra note 46 at 5.
49
Id.
50
Jennifer N. Lehmen, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural Property:
The Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and The UNIDROIT Draft Convention,
14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 538 (1997).
51
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
52
Id. at art. 5.
53
Id. at art. 6.
47
48
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against the acquisition or import of illegally removed cultural
property54; (e) they undertake to impose penalties or administrative
sanctions on any person involved in the illicit import or export of
cultural property55; (f) they undertake to participate in a concerted
international effort to determine and carry out the necessary concrete
measures under the Convention56, and (g) the Convention regards the
export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under
compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a
country by a foreign power as illicit.57
3. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
Problems with the 1970 UNESCO Convention underlay the
emergence of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.58 First, the 1970
UNESCO Convention was not self-executing, and thus the signatory
states had to adopt domestic legislation to implement it.59 In other
words, unless the signatory states to the UNESCO Convention
legislate domestic laws, the Convention does not become effective to
the signatory states directly. Second, with respect to the
implementation of the Convention, the signatory states can adjust the
provisions or measures of the Convention pursuant to their domestic
laws or regulations. Thus, the contents or level of scrutiny of the
Convention adopted by each signatory state lack uniformity. This
becomes an impediment to achieving purposes of the Convention.60
Third, Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention defines cultural property
only as cultural properties specifically designated by each member
state, leaving undiscovered or unexcavated cultural property

Id. at art. 7.
Id. at art. 8
56
Id. at art. 9.
57
Id. at art. 11.
58
Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does
The UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L., 469, 490-91 (1994); Carol A.
Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property-Who Owns the Past? An Introduction to
Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 185, 196
(2010).
59 ANDREA
F. G. RASCHÈR, KULTURGÜTERTRANSFER UND
GLOBALISIERUNG 53 (2000).
60
Id. at 61.
54
55
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unprotected.61Fourth, because the UNESCO Convention operated
mainly in terms of public law, it had limitations to stipulating clear
regulations in terms of private law, such as good faith acquisition.62
To solve those problems, UNESCO requested the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to
complement the regulations of private laws for a substantial
implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.63 Accordingly, a
preliminary draft was prepared by an expert study group, mainly
written by Austrian professor Gerte Reichelt. The Diplomatic
Conference to adopt the draft convention was held in Rome under
the auspices of the Italian government in June 1995, and the current
1995 UNIDROIT Convention64 was adopted through the voting of
member states on July 24, 1995. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
was intended to solve the problems inherent in the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, to embody the regulations of the UNESCO
Convention, and to establish uniform rules among states that would
facilitate the effective restitution of unlawfully possessed cultural
properties in terms of private law.
The adoption of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention does not
reduce the meaning or function of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
Whereas the UNESCO Convention aimed to “prohibit” and
“prevent” the export, import, and transfer of ownership of stolen or
illegally exported cultural properties, the UNIDROIT Convention
focuses on the “restitution” or “return” of stolen or illegally exported
cultural properties. So, the directing points of these two conventions
differ. Besides, the UNESCO Convention authorizes the contracting
“state” to take mainly “administrative” measures to prevent the
export and import of unlawful cultural properties, whereas the
UNIDROIT Convention gives the “owner” or “state” “judicial”
61
Ian M. Goldrich, Balancing the Need for Repatriation of Illegally Removed
Cultural Property with the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT
Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 118, 137-138 (1999);
Kathleen Anderson, The International Theft and Illegal Export of Cultural Property, 8
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 421 (2002).
62
RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 65.
63
Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO and UNIDROIT: A Partnership Against
Trafficking in Cultural Objects, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 59, 61 (1996).
64
See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11.
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powers to demand restitution or the return of cultural properties. In
this sense, the two Conventions have complementary goals.65
The features of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are
summarized as follows: First, the UNIDROIT Convention enables
claimants to demand the restitution of unregistered cultural
properties or privately owned cultural properties, unlike the
UNESCO Convention.66 Second, the UNIDROIT Convention does
not allow the good faith acquisition of stolen or illegally exported
cultural properties. Instead, such cultural properties should be
compulsorily returned.67 Third, it stipulates that a fair and reasonable
compensation should be paid to an acquirer in good faith instead of
unconditional restitution.68 Forth, the Convention imposes limitation
periods within which claimants must demand the return or restitution
of cultural property.69
B. Bilateral Agreements
1. Overview
Because multilateral conventions must contain common
concerns among all stakeholder countries, agreeing on concrete
content is difficult. In contrast, bilateral agreements can express the
interests of both parties; therefore, bilateral agreements are more
effective than a multilateral convention in attaining specific goals. In
cases where the return of a specific cultural property emerges as an
issue between country A and country B, the best way to solve the
problem is generally to conclude a bilateral agreement on the return
of the cultural property in dispute. For instance, Korea recovered the
Oegyujanggak Uigwe, stored previously in the BnF, through an
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Restitution of the Oegyujanggak
Uigwe between France and Korea in 2011.70 That same year, Korea
recovered another Uigwe of the Joseon Dynasty, which had been held

65
66
67
68
69
70

STAMATOUDI, supra note 27, at 67.
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3, 5.
Id.
Id. at art. 4, 6.
Id. at art. 3, 5.
See supra notes 1-3.

734

2016

Song

4:2

in the Kunaicho of Japan, by an Agreement on the Return of
Historical Archives between Japan and Korea.
Bilateral agreements not only target the restitution of specific
cultural property, but can also comprehensively handle overall
matters related to the restitution of cultural property between two
countries. There are many agreements which exemplify what can be
covered by a bilateral agreement. In the Belgo-Zairian Cultural
Agreement, concluded in 1970, Belgium agreed to return to Zaire71 all
the ethnological and artistic cultural properties acquired during the
colonial period.72 The Treaty on the Return of Stolen Cultural
Property, established in 1970 between the U.S. and Mexico,
concluded in 197073 stipulates that, e.g., when the Mexican
government requests the U.S. government to return stolen cultural
property, the U.S. government shall recover and return it to the
Mexican government.74 Similarly, in 1997 the U.S. and Canada
concluded an agreement prohibiting the import and export of objects
of archaeological and ethnological value75 in accordance with the
UNESCO Convention.
Bilateral agreements are effective in preventing illicit trade of
cultural property between neighboring states. Because of the wide
perception that multilateral conventions have little effect on the
restitution of cultural property, the adoption of bilateral agreements
is increasing.
Known as “Democratic Republic of the Congo” since 1997.
Huguette van Geluwe, Belgium’s Contribution to the Zairian Cultural
Heritage, 31 MUSEUM 32, 35 (1979); Treaty of Cooperation Between the United
States of American and the United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and
Return of stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Propertties, July 17, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088.
73 Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494,
T.I.A.S. No. 7088.
74
Regarding the meaning of this Treaty, see Michael S. Blass, Legal
Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural Property, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177,
1193-1194 (1978).
75
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the Unites States Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Certain
Categories of Archeological and Ethnological Material, April 10, 1997, CA1 EA
97T08 EXF.
71
72
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2. Exkurs: Agreement on Cultural Property Between the Republic
of Korea and Japan
A typical example of a bilateral agreement on the restitution
of cultural property signed by Korea is the Agreement on the Art Objects
and Cultural Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea76 in 1965.
After Korea’s emancipation from Japanese colonization in 1945,
Korea and Japan held seven rounds of bilateral talks from 1951 to
1965, culminating in the Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the
Republic of Korea,77 which stipulated normalization of their relations.78
Based on that Treaty, the Agreement on Cultural Property Between
Korea and Japan, which has a preamble, 4 articles of text, and an
annex, was also signed.
Among the contents of this Agreement, the significant article
related to the restitution of cultural property is Article 2: “The
Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the procedure to be
agreed upon between the two Governments, turn over to the
Government of the Republic of Korea the art objects enumerated in
the Annex within six months after the entry into force of the present
Agreement.”79 Article 2 mentions the subject, object, procedure, and
time of the turnover of cultural property.80

76
Agreement on the Art Objects and Cultural Co-operation between
Japan and the Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965[hereinafter Agreement on
Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan], translated in “The World and
Japan” Database Project at the University of Tokyo, available at
http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19650622.TNE.html,
(last visited May. 4, 2016).
77
Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,
June 22, 1965, translated in “The World and Japan” Database Project at the
University
of
Tokyo,
available
at
http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19650622.T1E.html,
(last visited May. 4, 2016).
78
See Geoffrey R. Scott, Spoliation, Cultural property, and Japan, 29 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 803, 854-57 (2008) (discussing the background and proceeding of this
Treaty).
79
Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan, supra
note 76.
80
Id.
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The subject of the turnover is the Japanese government, and
the subject of the takeover is the Korean government. The objects of
transfer are cultural properties enumerated in the Annex. The Annex
specifies a list of cultural properties totaling 1,432 pieces, including:
ceramic ware, archaeological relics, stone-made art objects, books,
and articles related to the postal service and telecommunications. The
procedure of turnover complies with a mutual agreement between
Korea and Japan.81 The time of turnover is stipulated as within six
months of the entry into force of the Agreement.
However, this Agreement has the following problems: First,
because the cultural properties exported to Japan during the colonial
period were illegally exported, the action to be taken should be
expressed as ‘recovery (回收)’ or ‘restitution (返還),’ but it is instead
neutrally expressed as ‘turnover (引き渡).’ This fails to make clear
the illicitness of the original export of the cultural property to Japan.
Second, this Agreement limits the cultural properties for turnover to
the 1,432 pieces of cultural property enumerated in the Annex.
After the Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea
and Japan was signed in 1965, the 1970 UNESCO Convention and
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention were concluded. There is a need
to review the correspondence between the Agreement on Cultural
Property Between Korea and Japan and the two Conventions.
Although both Korea and Japan signed the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, neither of them signed the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention. I here review the relationships among those three
treaties as if both Korea and Japan had signed the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.
The Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and
Japan is a bilateral agreement, and the 1970 UNESCO Convention
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are multilateral conventions.
Therefore, the Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and
Japan is special law (lex specialis), and the 1970 UNESCO Convention
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are general law (lex generalis).
According to the principle of Lex specialis derogat legi generali,82 the
81
82

Id. at art 2.
Latin maxim meaning “Special law repeals general laws.”

737

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan should be
applied over both Conventions. In terms of enforcement date, the
Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan
corresponds to prior law, and the 1970 UNESCO Convention and
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention correspond to posterior law.
Thus, according to the principle that Lex posterior derogat legi priori,83
the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention should be applied over the Agreement. Although those
ideas seem contradictory, they are actually not. If only the cultural
properties in the Annex to the Agreement on Cultural Property
Between Korea and Japan are targeted, this Agreement will take
precedence as lex specialis. However, if cultural properties illegally
exported to Japan other than those enumerated in the Annex are
included, then the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention take precedence as lex posterior.
IV. NEW JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES
A. International Conventions, National Laws and Domestic Courts
As of 2015, 129 states have signed the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, and only 37 states have signed the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.84 The difference between those two numbers is caused
by a considerable difference in normative aspect rather than the gap
between the enforcement dates of these two conventions.
Under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the subjects of its
rights and obligations are the governments of signatory states, which
should meet its requirements. In contrast, under the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention, not only signatory states, but also
organizations and individuals, obtain rights or obligations for
restitution of cultural properties. In other words, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention has the nature of public and administrative law85,
whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention has the nature of private
law centered on the restitution relationship between the current

83
84
85

Latin maxim meaning “Posterior law abrogates prior laws.”
See supra notes 10 and 11.
RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 65.
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possessor and original owner.86 In determining whether cultural
property is illicitly acquired or not, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
stipulates that the national laws of contracting states should be
applied,87 whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention directly
specifies ‘theft’ and ‘illicit export’ as the object of regulation.88 The
two conventions also show a great difference in the binding force of
their provisions. Since the 1970 UNESCO Convention is not selfexecuting, it secures no executive power against non-implementation.
On the contrary, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is self-executing
and a competent court in a signatory state can directly apply the
Convention’s provisions as governing law.89
This difference works as an important factor when each state
decides to join the convention. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
concnerns mainly the intent of signatory states’ administrative actions
for protecting cultural property, and so it is not difficult to
implement. Besides, because the Convention is not self-executing,
signatory states do not have to worry about normative binding power
or feel a great burden in signing this Convention. However, since the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention has direct effects on not only the
governments of signatory states, but also common individuals, it can
collide with domestic legal systems such as civil law. Thus, states have
shown reluctance to sign the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention until the
relations between its provisions and those of national laws have been
properly established.90 Thus, notwithstanding the international
convention to prevent illicit traffic in cultural property, national laws
still play an important role in tackling disputes over the restitution of
cultural property.

86
Zsuzsanna Veres, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property:
The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 91, 100 (2014).
87
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. See PATRICK J.
O’KEEFE, supra note 46, at 41 (providing interpretation of this Article).
88 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, art. 2, 3, and 5.
89 RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 70; see also BETTINA THORN,
INTERNATIONALER KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZ NACH DER UNIDROITKONVENTION 97 (2005).
90
Michael L. Durta, Sir, How Much is that Ming Vase in the Window?:
Protecting Cultural Relics in the People’s Republic of China, 5 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. &
POL’Y J. 62, 76-77 (2004).
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Suppose a cultural property owned by a private museum in
country A has been illegally exported to country B. If both country A
and country B are signatory states to the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention, the original owner of country A can file a lawsuit in a
court in country B to demand the restitution of cultural property
against the current possessor. In this case, the court decides on the
restitution of the cultural property based on the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.91 If neither country A nor country B is a signatory to the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, a court would decide on the
restitution of the cultural property according to domestic norms. In
that case, the civil law and cultural property protection law of the
country concerned are most central to domestic norms. Civil law and
cultural property protection law differ among countries. For instance,
under the Korean legal system, Korean civil law and cultural property
protection law are written in a code. Under the Anglo-American legal
system, civil law consists primarily of judicial precedent. The
definition of cultural property also varies by country, as do the
contents or scope of laws regulating cultural property.
The principles of trial are not currently specifically established
to handle disputes about the restitution of cultural property. Thus,
each country’s court is likely to handle a lawsuit filed for the
restitution of cultural property in the same way it handles a dispute
over the restitution of other objects. However, as reviewed above,
cultural property is res extra commercium,92 and thus it is not desirable to
handle lawsuits about cultural property in that way. Considering the
peculiarities of cultural properties, courts should apply special legal
doctrines to a case of restitution of a cultural property. For a given
cultural property, a new principle should apply in choosing the
governing law relevant to the dispute, and the burden of proof
should shift to the defendant.
B. New Principle for Choice of Governing Law
When a cultural property has been exported from a country
and situated in the territory of another country, and a person claiming
To apply the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention to this case, a cultural
property had to be stolen or exported after both states became parties to the
Convention. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at art. 10.
92
See supra notes 31-36.
91
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ownership of the cultural property has filed a lawsuit in a court, the
court must choose which state’s law governs.93 The substantial legal
issues in the ownership of an exported cultural property are
summarized as follows: First, if a cultural property was illegally
exported and distributed, and a third party has acquired the cultural
property without perceiving this inherent illegality, the court must
decide whether to recognize good faith acquisition for the third party.
Second, in cases where a third party has acquired the property outside
a transaction process and fails to meet the requirements for good
faith acquisition, the court must decide whether to recognize the
ownership based on the acquisitive prescription and whether the
right to demand restitution is extinguished according to the extinctive
prescription.
Representatively, the case of Winkworth vs. Christie, Mason &
Woods Ltd.94 was a case of whether to recognize good faith
acquisition. The case of Koerfer vs. Goldschmidt95 was a case of whether
acquisitive prescription was completed. The case of Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate of Jerusalem vs. Christie’s, Inc.96 was a case of whether or not
the extinctive prescription was completed. The requirements and
exercise processes for good faith acquisition, acquisitive prescription,
and extinctive prescription vary by country. So, in legal relationships
with foreign elements, which country’s law will be chosen as the
governing law is a decisive factor affecting lawsuit results.
The courts where the above-mentioned lawsuits were filed
chose the governing law according to the principle of lex rei sitae.
More specifically, those case were decided according to the laws of
the countries where the cultural properties were situated at the time a
juristic act to acquire it was performed or a juristic fact to create its
legal ownership was completed. When a court decides on a right
about an object, especially a movable object, it is not inherently
wrong to choose, as a governing law, the local law of the country
93
MICHAEL ANTON, INTERNATIONALES KULTURGÜTERPRIVAT- UND
ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 426 (2010).
94
Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., 1 All E.R. 1121 (1980).
95
Koerfer gegen Goldschmidt, BGE 94 II 297 (Swiss Federal Court, Dec. 13,
1968).
96
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., 1999 WL
673347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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where the act of altering a right is performed or a fact of creating a
right is completed. In fact, that choice is a general principle of private
international law.97 Also, if a court decides the dispute according to
the principle of lex rei sitae, the local law of that time is applied to a
transaction or acquisition performed within the territory where the
object is situated. Another result isthat, insofar as the court of a third
country respects the sovereignty of the country where the object is
situated, the court observes international comity.98
Although the principle of lex rei sitae is generalized in that
way, its application to cultural properties as if they were ordinary
objects can hardly deflect criticism for mechanically applying the law
without any thought of the nature of cultural properties. Suppose
that a cultural property owned by person of country A was stolen
and exported to country B and there purchased at an antique shop by
person , who does not know how it came to the shop. If person
filed a lawsuit in a court of country B against person demanding
the restitution of the property, the court in country B should decide
which country’s law is governing. In this case, if the court in country
B chooses according to the principle of lex rei sitae, the law of country
B where the object is currently situated will become the governing
law. If country B’s law recognizes good faith acquisition, person
will be able to maintain ownership through good faith acquisition.
Furthermore, suppose that person now sells this object to
person
in country C, and person
currently has possession. If
person has filed a lawsuit in a court of country C against person
demanding the restitution of the property, the court of country C
must also decide which country’s law is governing. This time, if,
according to the principle of lex rei sitae, the court of country C
decides whether or not person has properly acquired ownership of
the object, it will judge whether or not person
meets the
requirements of good faith acquisition. In that case, the governing
law would be the law of country B where the object was situated
when person ’s good faith acquisition was completed. Also, if the
court of country C judges that person
fails to meet the

Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow
of Illicit Cultural Property, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 111, 115 (2008).
98
Id. at 115.
97
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requirements of good faith acquisition but person is likely to meet
them, it can choose and apply, as a governing law, the law of country
C where the object was situated when person ’s good faith
acquisition was completed.
That is the mechanism for the choice of a governing law
according to the principle of lex rei sitae currently applied. However, it
can be justified only on the condition that the cultural property in
question is viewed as an object of transaction. In other words, that
procedure is only justifiable if the features of res extra commercium are
completely excluded from the cultural property, and it is considered a
normal object. However, cultural property is an object sui generis that
has inalienability as part of its basic nature; therefore, it is
inappropriate to treat cultural properties like normal objects.
Moreover, the legal regulations protecting cultural properties vary by
country. Suppose that a cultural property is illegally exported from
country A to country B. If country A’s law prohibits the distribution
or good faith acquisition of a cultural property, but country B’s law
recognizes good faith acquisition, the ownership of the cultural
property can be easily changed or laundered in country B by illegally
exporting the cultural property from country A to country B and
there involving an innocent third party for completion of good faith
acquisition. Afterwards, the illegal cultural property can be legally
distributed. In this hypothetical, country A’s law for cultural property
protection becomes meaningless. Thus, the principle of lex rei sitae is
likely to be abused as means of ownership laundering for cultural
properties, which require a principle of governing law different from
that of normal objects.
To this end, the principle of lex originis has been suggested as
an alternative.99 In cases where the principle of lex originis is adopted
as a governing law applicable to legal disputes about cultural
properties, the problem becomes deciding what should be viewed as
99
German scholar Prof. Erik Jayme has already proposed connecting
the factor “Heimatrecht” (law of home-country) and the developed lex orignis
rule in international disputes over cultural property. Erik Jayme, Internationales
Kulturgüterscchutz: Lex originis oder lex rei sitae – Tagung in Heidelberg, IPRAX 1990 at
347; see also Erik Jayme, Neue Anknüpfungsmaximen für den Kulturgüterschutz im
internationalen Privatrecht, in DOLZER ET AL., RECHTSFRAGEN DES
ITERNATIONALEN KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZES 5 (1994).
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the ‘origin’ of a cultural property to determine the ‘connecting
factors.’ Because cultural properties are historical products unlike
other objects, it is difficult to uniformly define their origin, which
requires consideration of multiple criteria,100 such as: religious value,
national identity, place where the cultural property was produced,
place where the cultural property is situated, place where the cultural
property was installed, place where the cultural property was found,
place where the cultural property was inherited, and place where the
cultural property was designated as res extra commercium.
In summation, a court having jurisdiction over cultural
property disputes should judge what connecting factors should be
established and which country’s law should be adopted as a
governing law. In this regard, two values can conflict: transaction
safety and cultural property protection. In other words, the court
must decide whether to place a high value on protecting a good faith
purchaser of a cultural property or to privilege the original owner of a
cultural property. A court that emphasizes the former will generally
determine governing law according to the conventional principle of
lex rei sitae, whereas a court that regards the latter as more important
will adopt the alternative principle of lex originis as governing law. In
short, the principle of lex rei sitae is generally appropriate as governing
law for normal objects, whereas the principle of lex originis is
appropriate for cultural property.101
C. Shifting the Burden of Proof
Who bears the burden of proof in a civil suit greatly affects
the results. In the period of Roman law, the general principal for the
burden of proof was not stably established. However the principle
“Necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit”102 was in common use.
Afterwards, with the development of the law of evidence, a
contemporary principle of the burden of proof was established by
100

WEIDNER, supra note 31, at 194-201; ANTON, supra note 93, at 851-

91.

101
Fincham, supra note 97, at 146; Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-ofLaw Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1177 (2005).
102
Latin maxim meaning “The burden of proof is on the one who
declares, not on one who denies.”
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German scholar Leo Rosenberg: Each party to proceedings must
assert and prove the existence of the conditions for application of the
rule on which s/he relies.103 According to this principle, if an object
has been transferred from its owner to another person without legal
ground and is currently kept by the other person, the owner should
prove ownership of the object.
But what if the object is a cultural property? Current civil
procedure laws have no specific regulations in that regard. If the
principle of the burden of proof is equally applied to a cultural
property, the person who asserts ownership of the cultural property
currently possessed by another person must prove ownership of the
object and that the other person possesses it illegally. However, that
principle is inappropriate to cultural properties because they have
basically the nature of inalienability, unlike normal objects. If a
cultural property designated as res extra commercium by a national law is
transferred to other place, it does not exist under normal conditions.
So in that case, the person who currently possesses the cultural
property should be required to prove he has duly acquired it. If he
fails to prove his legitimacy in possessing the cultural property, the
property should be returned to the original owner.
It could cause confusion to the current property system to
shift the burden of proof for all cultural properties in restitution
lawsuits. Accordingly, the burden of proof should be shifted only for
cultural properties that meet certain requirements. Such cultural
properties can be reviewed in terms of two aspects. The first is
category, such as cultural properties that represent royal authority and
religious cultural properties that belonged to churches or temples. It
should be difficult to assume that a state or churches or temples sold
or donated such cultural properties to other persons. An individual
person who possesses those kinds of cultural property should be
required prove that s/he acquired it legitimately. The second aspect
concerns the time of acquisition. If a cultural property was exported
without a legitimate source of right in a time of war or colonization,
it cannot be easily accepted that the current possessor of the cultural

“Jede Partei hat die Voraussetzungen der ihr günstigen Norm (=
derjenigen Norm, deren Rechtswirkung ihr zugute kommt) zu behaupten und zu
beweisen.” in LEO ROSENBERG, DIE BEWEISLAST 98-99 (1965).
103
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property acquired it legitimately. Therefore, in that case, the current
possessor should be required to prove that s/he acquired it
legitimately. However, it is necessary to set a time limit for that shift
in the burden of proof to recent wars or colonial periods with
reasonable current influence.
As a possible example for shifting the burden of proof,
consider a special exhibition called the Ogura104 collection in the
Tokyo National Museum, Japan. It contains a helmet and armor
worn by King Gojong, who reigned when Japan annexed Korea.
That armor and helmet are those King Gojong put on in war and are
the symbols of the supreme commander. Thus, they cannot have
been transferred or donated to another person. They were quite likely
to have been exported during the Japanese colonial period, and it is
unlikely that they were sold or donated to Ogura. Thus, if the Korean
government were to demand that the Tokyo Museum return them,
the Tokyo Museum, as current possessor of the cultural properties,
should be required prove that it acquired them legitimately.
V. CONCLUSION
These days, each state tries to protect its cultural properties
and recover illicitly exported cultural properties. There is controversy
over whether cultural properties are the exclusive property of each
country (cultural nationalism) or the common heritage of humanity
(cultural internationalism). However, it is obvious illicit trafficking of
cultural properties should be prohibited and illicitly exported cultural
properties should be returned to their country of origin. The 1970
UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are
based on that perception. These international conventions are
important because they are international standards to prevent the
illicit export of cultural properties and enable the restitution of illicitly
exported cultural properties. However, because the 1970 UNESCO
104
Ogura Dakenoske (小倉 武之助: 1870–1964) was a Japanese
businessman who collected a huge number of Korean cultural properties during
the Japanese colonial era in Korea. He donated his collected Korean cultural
properties to the Tokyo National Museum. Park Soo-mee, Legacy Lost: Korea’s
Missing Treasures, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2898892
(last accessed May 4, 2016).
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Convention focused on administrative measures of the government
to “prevent” the illicit trafficking of cultural properties and lacks selfexecuting power, it is limited to being a basic norm for the restitution
of illicitly exported cultural properties. To reinforce those weak
points, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention was promulgated, but
counties worried about recession in the art market are reluctant to
sign. These two Conventions cannot be applied to restitution of
cultural properties exported illicitly to other countries before signing
the Convention because neither of them has retroactive effects.
Therefore, countries involved in disputes over the restitution of
cultural properties tend to solve them by concluding bilateral
conventions. The 1965 Agreement on Cultural Property Between
Korea and Japan has a significant meaning in that it was a
comprehensive attempt made between Korea and Japan to handle
the restitution of cultural properties exported during the Japanese
colonial period.
Disputes over restitution of cultural properties that are not
subject to multilateral or bilateral conventions can be solved through
the decision of a court. However, no specific legal regulation under
domestic laws is applicable to disputes over restitution of cultural
properties, which means that legal principles applied to normal
objects have been applied to disputes over cultural properties.
However, cultural properties are basically res extra commercium, a
concept that originated in Roman law and is acknowledged in each
country’s cultural property protection law. Disputes over cultural
properties require application of legal principles different from those
used for normal objects. In other words, it is desirable for courts to
apply the principle of lex originis instead of lex rei sitae in choosing
governing law.105 Furthermore, when proving the ownership of a
cultural property, it is also desirable to make a defendant prove
legitimate acquisition of cultural properties within certain categories.
Applying that suggestion to lawsuits presents challenges.106
105
It is remarkable that Belgium adopted in the Codification of Private
International Law of July 27, 2004, a modified lex originis rule regarding recovery
of the illegally removed cultural patrimony. See Fincham, supra note 97 at 147.
106
For example, these two problems might actually be difficult to solve:
a concrete criterion for deciding on the country of origin of a cultural property
and a concrete criterion to determine which cultural property can be accepted
for shifting the burden of proof.
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Nevertheless, if a court acknowledges the peculiarity of cultural
properties and adopts that suggestion, international disputes over the
restitution of illicitly exported cultural properties could be solved
more smoothly.

748

